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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
-vs-
JOSE A. FIDEL GARCIA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 970443-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Jose A. Fidel Garcia appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs (DUI), Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1997), a class B misdemeanor. 
The conviction was entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, West Valley 
Department, the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court correctly hold that State regulations governing the monthly 
certification of alcohol breath testing instruments do not require the certifying officer to record, 
in the certification log, the actual readings obtained when the instruments measure samples of 
known alcohol content? This Court will not defer to the trial court's interpretation of the 
regulations in question. However, it is appropriate to grant some deference to an administrative 
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agency's interpretation of its own regulations, see, e.g., Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 7i, 811 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, this Court should defer to the Utah 
Public Safety Department's interpretation of its breath testing regulations. 
II. If the trial court incorrectly interpreted the breath testing regulations, and if this Court 
holds that the regulations were violated in this case, then what remedy is due for this defendant 
and for similarly-situated DUI defendants? Because the trial court did not answer this question, 
this Court will review it de novo; no deference is possible. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent "due process" clause, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1, proclaims: 
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law 
. . .." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1993) is the statute governing admissibility of alcohol breath 
test results; it is copied in appendix B of defendant's Brief of Appellant. Utah Admin. Code § 
R714-500, enacted pursuant to section 41-6-44.3, contains the regulations that are the subject of 
this appeal; it is copied in appendix C of defendant's Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) 
following a stop and arrest on 05-06 April 1996. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the result 
of his postarrest breath alcohol test, asserting that the monthly certification log for the breath-
testing instrument had been improperly kept, and that therefore, the breath test result was 
inadmissible. Upon consideration of the parties' memoranda and arguments, the trial court 
denied that motion by written ruling (R. 68-74) (copied in Br. of Appellant appendix A). On 30 
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May 1997, defendant pleaded guilty to DUI, reserving, pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) and 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial 
suppression motion. He was sentenced to jail term, probation, and a fine; the jail and fine were 
stayed pending this appeal (R. 130-31). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts are undisputed. Following his DUI arrest, defendant Garcia's breath 
was tested with an "Intoxilyzer 5000" instrument. This brand and model of instrument is 
commonly used in Utah for breath-testing of DUI arrestees. 
To assure the Intoxilyzers' accuracy, "certified breath alcohol testing technicians" inspect 
them every month (the pertinent regulation, Utah Admin Code § R714-500-6D(3), calls for an 
inspection every forty days). Regulations governing these monthly inspections have been 
established by the Utah Department of Public Safety, as directed under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
44.3 (1993). During these inspections, the Intoxilyzers are tested for their ability to measure 
"known reference samples," or "simulator solutions" of known alcohol content, equivalent to 
known weights of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, within an accuracy tolerance of .005 gram per 
210 liters, or 5 percent, whichever is greater. This accuracy standard is prescribed by regulation, 
Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-5B(3) (Br. of Appellant appendix C), and must be satisfied in 
order for the instrument(s) to be certified for use. The technicians keep a certification log 
("permanent record book"), as required by Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-6D(5), recording the 
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Intoxilyzers' performance on the monthly known reference sample testing, along with other 
criteria used to certify that the instruments are functioning properly.1 
The certified breath alcohol testing technician for Salt Lake area Intoxilyzers is Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Scott Hathcock. In his monthly certification log, Trooper Hathcock has 
not recorded the numeric readings obtained during the Intoxilyzers' measurement of known 
reference samples. Instead, Hathcock's log simply notes "OK" for each inspection date on which 
the Intoxilyzers satisfied the .005 gram or 5 percent accuracy standard (a partial copy of the log 
for the Intoxilyzer used in this case is in Br. of Appellant appendix D). Thus if the instrument 
tested a reference sample known to have a .200 alcohol content, and the test reading was between 
.190 and .210 (the 5 percent standard), the certification log entry would be "OK." 
The foregoing method of recording the known reference sample testing has not always 
been used. Prior to September 1995, Trooper Hathcock wrote the actual numeric readings for 
known reference sample testing in the log. Thus if the known reference sample was .200, and the 
Intoxilyzer measured that sample as .202, the certification log would so reflect (see Br. of 
Appellant appendix D). Beginning in September 1995, however, the "OK" notation was utilized 
(see id). That recordkeeping method was used until approximately March 1997, when DUI 
defendants began challenging it in the trial courts: at that time, Trooper Hathcock reinstituted the 
practice of writing the actual readings in his certification log. As can be seen from review of the 
log in this case, at the time this defendant's breath was tested, in April 1996, the "OK" method of 
noting the known reference sample testing was used. 
*The certification log also notes other aspects of the intruments' performance which are tested monthly. Those 
other performance criteria are not at issue in this appeal. 
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Besides noting results of known reference sample testing in the certification log, the 
technician also completes a sworn "Intoxilyzer Affidavit" for each instrument following each 
monthly inspection. Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1993), Intoxilyzer Affidavits are 
utilized, in lieu of live testimony by the certified breath test technician, to prove that the 
instrument used to test a particular defendant for breath alcohol content was performing 
accurately. In a process that this Court has dubbed "bookending," see State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 
469, 471 (Utah App. 1989), trial courts accept Intoxilyzer Affidavits commemorating the 
monthly Intoxilyzer certification conducted before and after the breath test of the particular 
defendant: If the Affidavits show that the instrument passed those "bookend" certification tests, 
they trigger a statutory presumption that the defendant's test result is accurate, and therefore, 
admissible. See id. (The Intoxilyzer Affidavits pertaining to this case are copied in appendix I of 
this brief.) 
The Intoxilyzer Affidavits recite the .005 gram or 5 percent accuracy standard set forth in 
the Administrative Code.2 Therefore, by checking "yes" in that section of the Intoxilyzer 
Affidavit, the technician certifies, under oath, that the instrument satisfied this accuracy standard 
during the monthly "bookend" inspection in question. That sworn "yes" entry corresponds to the 
"OK" entry (or numeric entry) in the certification log. 
Defendant challenges the "OK" method of documenting the known reference sample test 
measurements in the monthly certification log. In short, he argues that "OK is not OK." 
According to defendant, the pre-September 1995 method—that is, writing the actual numeric 
2The pertinent section of the Intoxilyzer Affidavit reads: "Checked with known sample: (simulator, 3 tests within 
+ or - .005 or 5 % whickever is the greatest)," followed by checkspaces for "yes" or "no." 
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readings for known reference sample testing in the log—is required under the pertinent 
regulations. Furthermore, argues defendant, Trooper Hathcock's violation of the regulations 
amounts to a constitutional "due process" violation, requiring suppression of the breath alcohol 
result in his case—and in every other DUI case involving the "OK" documentation method. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court correctly held that the Public Safety Department regulations permit 
entry of "OK" in the monthly certification log, rather than actual readings, to record the 
Intoxilyzers' performance on known reference sample testing. Defendant's contrary reading of 
the regulations erroneously conflates discrete portions of the regulations, out of context, to 
support his desired result. In fact, the regulations contain no plain directive to enter the actual 
known reference sample measurements. Because "OK" means that the Intoxilyzer measured 
known reference samples within the strict, .005 gram or 5 percent standard, there is nothing 
wrong with entering "OK," rather than the actual number, in the certification log. 
II. Even if defendant's reading of the regulations were correct, Trooper Hathcock's 
failure to obey those regulations would not justify the broad remedy of suppression, or exclusion, 
of the breath test result in this and similar cases. Failure to obey administrative regulations does 
not ipso facto amount to a constitutional violation. No constitutional principle commands entry 
of the actual known reference sample measurements into the certification log; therefore, it would 
be improper to suppress breath test results for failure to so record those measurements. 
Furthermore, the statute addressing admissibility of breath test results does not make 
perfect compliance with the regulations a sine qua non for admission of such results at trial. 
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Instead, the statute merely permits foundation for breath test results to be laid by hearsay. If the 
hearsay-based foundation is insufficient, the statute does not authorize exclusion of breath test 
results, but rather, permits the necessary foundation to be established by live testimony. Thus the 
only remedy to which defendant might be entitled is an order requiring the prosecution to 
establish the necessary foundation by live testimony, rather than by hearsay. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
BREATH TEST REGULATIONS DO NOT REQUIRE ENTRY 
OF ACTUAL NUMERIC READINGS FOR MONTHLY 
TESTING ON KNOWN REFERENCE SAMPLES 
The trial court rejected defendant Garcia's argument that the breath test regulations 
require entry, into the monthly certification log, of the numeric readings yielded on known 
reference sample testing (R. 72-73, Br. of Appellant appendix A). This Court will revisit the 
meaning of the regulations as a legal question, without deference to the trial court. However, at 
least "intermediate" deference is proper toward a government agency's interpretation of its own 
regulations in a case such as this one, involving delegated legislative authority and the 
application of technical expertise. See Thorup Bros. Const, v. Auditing Div. Of Utah State Tax 
Comm % 860 P.2d 324, 327 (Utah 1993); Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 811 
P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991); Barnard v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Utah State Tax Comm % 905 P.2d 
317, 320 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, deference would be appropriate toward the Utah 
Highway Patrol, the branch of the Utah Public Safety Department that implements the breath test 
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regulations. But regardless of the deference level, the trial court's interpretation of the breath test 
regulations should be affirmed. 
Proper analysis of the regulations begins with an understanding of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44.3 (1993), the breath test statute, under which the breath test regulations were developed. 
The statute sets forth a method for proving, by hearsay, that a DUI defendant's breath was tested 
by an accurate instrument. Admissibility of such proof requires that three conditions be satisfied: 
(1) the hearsay—in this case, Intoxilyzer Affidavits and monthly certification logs—must reflect 
compliance with the breath test regulations; (2) the hearsay documents must be made in the 
regular course of, and contemporaneously to, the acts recorded therein; and (3) the source of the 
hearsay information must be trustworthy. See subsec. 41-6-44.3(2) (paraphrased and reordered). 
In this case, the first of the foregoing three conditions is in dispute—that is, the question 
whether Trooper Hathcock complied with the breath test regulations when he prepared the 
Intoxilyzer Affidavits and certification log for the instrument used to test defendant's breath. As 
follows, Trooper Hathcock did comply with those regulations—as properly interpreted. 
Defendant's argument notwithstanding, nothing in the breath test regulations squarely 
requires the technician to write the actual numeric readings, for monthly testing of known 
reference samples, in the certification log. The regulations contain no direct command, such as: 
"The numeric results of testing on known reference samples, performed under section R714-500-
6(3), shall be recorded in the monthly certification log." Indeed, in his analysis purporting to 
prove that the regulations' "plain language" establishes such a requirement, defendant invokes no 
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less than four (and as many as eleven) discrete sections and subsections of the regulations (Br. of 
Appellant at 9-14). In short, what defendant says is "plain," is anything but. 
By citing so many discrete regulatory provisions, defendant Garcia strains to reach the 
result that he desires. It must be recalled that the breath test statute focuses on testing with an 
accurate instrument. Toward that end, section R714-500-5 of the breath test regulations 
addresses "Instrument Certification." Regulation section 5 sets forth standards for assuring 
instrument accuracy—including the requirement that the instruments measure reference samples 
within .005 gram or 5 percent of their known alcohol content. Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-
5B(3). Nothing in this regulatory subsection, nor in the balance of section R714-500-5, 
commands the breath test technician to record the known reference sample readings in any 
particular manner. 
In fact, the ensuing subsection, R.714-500-5B(4), provides latitude in the instrument 
certification requirements: "The specificity of the [certification] procedure shall be adequate and 
appropriate for the reasonable analysis of breath specimen for the determination of alcohol 
concentration in law enforcement." This latitude is reiterated in yet another subsection of the 
instrument certification regulation, requiring "any other tests deemed necessary by the 
Department [of Public Safety] to correctly and adequately evaluate the instrument, give 
reasonably correct results in routine breath alcohol testing and be practical and reliable for law 
enforcement purposes." Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-5B(5). 
Because there is latitude plainly built into the instrument certification procedure, the fair 
and reasonable implication is that there must also be latitude built into the manner in which that 
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procedure is recorded. Indeed, the instrument certification regulation is silent about the contents 
of the certification log: it merely dictates "[t]he instrument functions to be checked," Utah 
Admin. Code § R714-500-5B(4), including, without elaboration, the requirement that the 
instrument be tested on known reference samples. Thus a fair reading of the instrument 
certification regulation is simply that the certification log, or any documentation of the monthly 
inspection and certification process, must show that the instrument satisfied the .005 or 5 percent 
accuracy standard. That, of course, is precisely what the notation "OK," in Trooper Hathcock's 
monthly certification log, along with the Intoxilyzer Affidavits, do in this case. 
Doggedly pursuing his "OK is not OK" theory, defendant jumps track from the 
instrument certification regulations, just discussed, to the program certification requirements of 
R714-500-6 (Br. of Appellant at 11). Those section 6 requirements also do not support 
defendant's argument. Indeed, this Court has previously held that the program certification 
regulation "establishes the criteria for certification of a breath testing program, not the 
requirements for obtaining a presumptively valid and admissible breath test result" Salt Lake 
City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 446 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added) (the regulation at that 
time was numbered R735-500-6; it is now R714-500-6). Thus for purposes of admitting breath 
test results, program certification requirements are discrete from instrument certification. 
Noncompliance with program certification requirements, under the law as interpreted by this 
Court, does not affect whether an instrument was properly certified—i.e., shown to be functioning 
accurately, so that breath test results obtained therefrom are admissible at a DUI trial. 
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The purpose of the program certification regulations, gleaned from reading them as a 
whole, is to assure that all law enforcement agencies that perform alcohol breath testing—i.e., 
agencies that have breath test "programs"-perform such testing in the manner prescribed by the 
Public Safety Department. Toward that end, the program certification regulations prescribe the 
monthly instrument inspections, R714-500-6D(3) & -(4), and require the breath test technician to 
keep the monthly certification log ("permanent record book"), R714-500-6D(5), commemorating 
those inspections. Once again, the program certification regulations do not specify any particular 
method of recording the monthly certification results in the certification log. 
Also contained within program certification regulations—and central to defendant 
Garcia's argument on appeal—is a subsection prescribing how breath test programs will record 
"analytical results." That subsection, R714-500-6D(6), states: 
All analytical results shall be expressed in terminology established by state 
statute and reported to two decimal places for a 4011 series intoxilyzer, and to 
three decimal places for a 5000 series intoxilyzer. (For example, a result of 0.237 
g/210L shall be reported as 0.23 on a 4011 series intoxilyzer, or 0.237 g/210L 
shall be reported as 0.237 on a 5000 series intoxilyzer, or as stated by the 
Department [)]. 
Defendant argues that "analytical results," which must be reported to three decimal places on the 
Intoxilyzer 5000, include the measurements obtained when the instruments are tested each month 
on known reference samples (Br. of Appellant at 11). But no portion of the regulations plainly 
declares* that "analytical results" include the results of known reference sample testing during the 
monthly instrument certification. 
To the contrary, reading the above-quoted subsection in its context as a program 
certification requirement, it is readily apparent that "analytical results" do not include the results 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
State v. Garcia, Page 12 
of known reference sample testing; rather, "analytical results" are the results obtained when a 
DUI arrestee's breath is tested. For one thing, as observed by the trial court (R. 72), the "three 
decimal places" requirement, for the Intoxilyzer 5000, stands in contrast to the "two decimals" 
requirement for the less precise predecessor instrument, the Intoxilyzer 4011. Thus the "three 
decimals" requirement simply contrasts the older instrument with the newer one, and directs 
breath test programs to record their breath test results in accord with their particular instruments' 
capabilities. Further, the parenthetical example in the regulation, 0.237 g/210L, is the type of 
result that would be achieved from actual breath testing, not from known reference sample 
testing, which utilizes known samples of 0.100, 0.200, and the like (see certification log in Br. of 
Appellant appendix D). Thus by clear implication, the term "analytical results" refers to breath 
test results, not to results of known reference sample testing. Cf Westerman v. State, 525 P.2d 
1359 (Okl. Crim. App. 1974) (distinguishing "procedures for analysis," from "maintenance 
requirements" for breath test instruments). 
Defendant Garcia also attempts to engraft, into the monthly certification log, the 
regulatory requirement that breath test instruments read results in grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath, found in both the instrument certification and program certification regulations, R714-
500-5B(4) and R714-500-6D(4). But that "reads in grams" requirement, as the trial court also 
observed (R. 72-73), simply tracks a statutory requirement, found in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44(2)(c) (1993) (Utah's DUI statute), specifying the measurement unit for blood and breath 
alcohol test results; it is, as the above-cited regulation states, "the terminology established by 
state statute." An instrument that gives results in some other units—such as ounces per gallon, 
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for example—is not acceptable under Utah statute, no matter how accurately it may give those 
results. The statutory "reads in grams" requirement, echoed in the regulations, says nothing 
about how monthly known reference sample testing should be recorded in the certification log; it 
is a discrete statutory requirement (R. 73). 
As just explained, the trial court correctly declined to adopt defendant Garcia's 
hypertechnical incorporation of discrete breath test instrument and program certification 
requirements into one another. The trial court read the regulations as a whole, yet did not lose 
track of the differing purpose of each regulatory subsection. And again—the trial court did not 
find, nor does defendant identify, any regulatory or statutory language that squarely requires the 
full numeric results of known reference sample testing to be written into the monthly certification 
log. As far as the written law is concerned, "OK is OK." 
This conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the legitimate underlying policy 
concerns. Because an arrestee's breath test result will obviously be a focal point of the ensuing 
DUI prosecution, it is wholly proper, and highly desireable, that such analytical result be 
recorded to the requisite three decimal places, rather than "rounding off such result or merely 
noting that it exceeded the statutory .080 level for impairment. Accordingly, the breath test 
regulations command that the actual results of actual breath tests be noted to three decimal places 
(or two, if on the older instrument). Indeed, defendant Garcia notes that such three decimal place 
individual test results are recorded in a separate log book, not the certification log, kept at each 
Intoxilyzer site (Br. of Appellant at 13-14 & appendix E). 
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No similar urgency attends the results of monthly known reference sample testing, as 
demonstrated by a commonsense understanding of the exactitude required to support the "OK" 
entry in the certification log. There are sixteen ounces in a pound, and yet a gram is only about 
1/28 ounce. The standard breath volume for Intoxilyzer results is 210 liters, which is 
approximately the size of a 55-gallon oil drum. To justify an "OK" entry on the certification log, 
and a "yes" on the Intoxilyzer Affidavit, the Intoxilyzer must measure a known reference sample 
of .200 gram in a range from .190 to .210 gram (five percent), in that 210 liter volume. This .020 
gram range equates to 1/1400 of an ounce (.020 times 1/28) within that roughly 55 gallon 
volume. If the instrument misses that range by even .001 gram--e.g., if it reads .189 or .211, the 
technician cannot certify the instrument for service. Therefore, even without entry of the exact 
readings taken from known reference samples, satisfaction of the .005 or five percent standard, 
reflected in the "OK" certification log entry and the "yes" Affidavit entry, proves that the 
instrument was operating accurately—that is, within its strict accuracy standard. It is neither 
required nor necessary that the actual numeric reading be written in the certification log. 
In the end, a good analogy might be made to a simple ruler. The .005 gram or 5 percent 
accuracy requirement for the Intoxilyzer 5000 is analogous to the width of a ruler's lines, 
marking off the ruler's gradations. So long as a known quantity of alcohol meets the .005 gram 
or 5 percent standard, or a stick of known length reaches to the appropriate line on the ruler, the 
instrument—be it Intoxilyzer or ruler—can be confidently deemed accurate. That is what is 
reflected by Trooper Hathcock's "OK" notation in the Intoxilyzer certification log: the known 
reference sample tested "on the line." Because the line is extremely thin, exactly where "within 
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the line" the sample tested is of no significance. There is no need to document that particular 
measurement; nor do the governing regulations require such documentation. 
In sum, the trial court correctly held that the breath test regulations do not require entry of 
actual, numeric known reference sample test results into the monthly Intoxilyzer certification log. 
Instead, "OK is OK." For this reason, the trial court's judgment, and defendant Garcia's 
conviction, should be affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF THE BREATH TEST REGULATIONS REQUIRE 
ENTRY OF NUMERIC REFERENCE SAMPLE READINGS 
INTO THE CERTIFICATION LOG, THE FAILURE TO DO SO 
DOES NOT JUSTIFY SUPPRESSION OR EXCLUSION OF 
BREATH TEST RESULTS 
Even if this Court endorses defendant's reading of the breath test regulations, it should 
not order the sweeping remedy that he demands—suppression or exclusion of the breath test 
result in this and similar DUI cases. Even assuming that Trooper Hathcock failed to obey the 
regulations, such error does not rise to the level of an evidentiary or constitutional violation. 
Accordingly, suppression or exclusion are not appropriate. 
A. Recordkeeping Errors Do Not Justify Exclusion or Suppression of Evidence. 
The error alleged by defendant is simply one of recordkeeping: he asserts that actual 
numbers, instead of the notation "OK," must be entered into the monthly Intoxilyzer certification 
log.3 In accord with sound precedent, this Court has succinctly answered the claim that such 
3In his brief, defendant accuses the State of "misleadingly referring] to the violation in this case as a 
'bookkeeping' error" (Br. of Appellant at 23). At oral argument of his motion, defense counsel stated: "I am 
not, there's no question that, here whether or not every 40 days Trooper Hathcock went and he tested that 
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error justifies exclusion of evidence: "We likewise decline to elevate administrative 
bookkeeping requirements to the status of rules of evidence." Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 
P.2d 443, 447 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that failure to complete pre-test Intoxilyzer checklist 
did not justify exclusion of breath test result). In State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 469 (Utah App. 1989) 
(described in this briefs Statement of Facts), this Court held that successful "bookending" is not 
a requirement for admission of breath test results (the instrument in Vigil had passed its monthly 
certification prior to the defendant's breath test, but had subsequently malfunctioned). 
Other cases are in accord with this Court's holdings in Vigil and Emerson. For example, 
in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Internal Revenue Service's violation of its regulations for taperecording taxpayer interviews did 
not justify exclusion of evidence obtained thereby. Further, in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 
128 (1978), the Supreme Court declined to suppress wiretapping evidence that had been obtained 
in violation of statutory "minimization" rules. Consistent with such cases, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Auditing Division of Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 842 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1992), stated that "courts should also uphold reasonable and rational departures from 
[administrative] rules absent a showing that the departure violated some other right." 
At most, this case involves a reasonable regulatory departure that violates no right of 
defendant. As previously explained, the log notation "OK," along with the "yes" entry on the 
Intoxilyzer Affidavits, shows that the instrument in question tested known reference samples 
within a remarkably strict accuracy standard. Therefore, even if the regulations call for entry of 
machine. There's no question. The argument is that it wasn't reported as required by the rules. When it's not 
reported as required by the rules, it's violating the processes that's been set out" (T. 27) (emphasis added). 
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numbers, rather than "OK," in the certification log, Trooper Hathcock's use of "OK" should be 
deemed a reasonable departure from those regulations. Additionally, it should be self-evident 
that Hathcock's bookkeeping method violates no meaningful individual rights. As already 
explained, the statutory right, under section 41-6-44.3, is to be tested with an accurate 
instrument. The statute does not even tell the Public Safety Department what the accuracy 
standard should be—much less how to keep its record books. Therefore, even assuming a 
violation of the Department's recordkeeping requirements, such violation does not rise to a level 
that justifies the sweeping remedy of exclusion or suppression. 
A well-reasoned case from the Washington Supreme Court, State v. Wittenbarger, 880 
P.2d 517 (Wash. 1994) (en banc), further supports the conclusion that no significant right is 
violated by the "OK" bookkeeping method in this case. In Wittenbarger, the en banc supreme 
court held that that as a matter of constitutional law, breath test technicians need not record any 
of the numeric readings yielded during the periodic (yearly) inspection of the breath test 
instruments (DataMasters) used in that state. 880 P.2d at 519-27. The defendants in 
Wittenbarger raised a due process-based "duty to preserve evidence" argument with respect to 
those readings, under California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). In this case, defendant 
Garcia similarly argued that he was entitled to know the exact numeric results of the monthly 
known reference sample readings (T. 34). 
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the "duty to preserve" argument, finding no 
basis to believe that the nonpreserved evidence was potentially exculpatory. Therefore, the state 
had no duty to preserve it: 
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In our view, the records currently available to the defense contain ample 
information regarding the condition of the DataMasters. The new [inspection] 
protocols, coupled with the improved DataMaster technology, create a system of 
accurate and reliable chemical breath analysis. Absent a more convincing 
showing by the defense, we make no finding of bad faith and, thus, find no due 
process violation. 
Id. at 523. Accord Emerson, 861 P.2d at 448 (no duty to preserve test cards noting insufficient 
initial breath samples); Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 51A P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978) 
(failure to check one box on breath test checklist did not justify suppression of test result). The 
analysis in Wittenbarger is thorough and sound.4 Along with the above-cited Utah and federal 
authority, it teaches that there is no individual right violation in Trooper Hathcock's use of "OK" 
to document the Intoxilyzers' satisfactory measurements of known reference samples. 
Common sense also demonstrates that the actual readings yielded from "known reference 
sample" testing could not be sufficiently exculpatory to require that they be written into the 
certification log, or preserved in any way. Awareness of the regulatory standard for Intoxilyzer 
accuracy gives DUI defendants adequate information, comparable to the missing actual test 
numbers, for use at trial. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 (state's duty to preserve evidence 
applies only when evidence has apparent exculpatory value and when defendant cannot 
reasonably obtain comparable evidence). Recall once again that the Intoxilyzer certification or 
4The Washington Supreme Court has operated at the forefront of judicial analysis of breath test results, dating 
back to State v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1960) (en banc), which gave us the "Baker rule." 
Defendant Garcia really only offers one potentially-supporting case, State v. Brown, 672 N.E.2d 1050 (Ohio 
App. 4 Dist. 1996), in support of his argument. Brown, a 2-1 decision, held that the exact concentration of the 
known reference sample had not been properly proven when it was certified to have a "target value of 0.10 
g/210L plus or minus .005." The majority in Brown, citing expert testimony from the defense, held that "0.10" 
is not necessarily equal to "0.100," and therefore, the instrument in question might not have been adequately 
inspected using the reference sample in question. In this case, defendant produced no expert testimony to support 
his bid for suppression. No other case cited by defendant is similar to Brown. Those cases are distinguishable 
from this case as well, and are summarized in appendix II of this brief. 
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"bookending" readings had to pass the .005 gram or five percent accuracy standard, or else the 
technician could not have certified, under oath, that the instrument was functioning properly. 
This information gave defendant Garcia the knowledge that his breath alcohol level, which the 
instrument measured at .186 gram/210L, was actually within a range from .178 to .194 (the five 
percent standard). This allowed him to argue--fo the trier of fact—that such range of possible 
"true" readings might raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Cf Emerson, 861 P.2d at 447-48. 
Such argument seems unlikely to succeed, given that the statutory impairment standard, Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997), is only .080 gram/210L. 
However, a DUI defendant who tested at the .080 level could argue that his "true" reading 
could be as low as .075 gram (the .005 gram standard). Absent other evidence of impairment 
(such as driving pattern, field sobriety tests, and so forth), such a defendant might be acquitted in 
a DUI trial. But neither defendant Garcia, nor a defendant whose breath alcohol reading is at the 
statutory borderline, needs to know the exact "bookending" readings in order to receive a fair 
trial—that is, a trial that grants a fair opportunity to defend, and will reach a just result. That, as a 
matter of substantial rights, is all that is required.5 For this reason, too, the trial court's 
judgment, and defendant Garcia's conviction, should be affirmed. 
B. No Remedy Beyond Denial of Hearsay-Based Foundation Can be Required. 
Finally, if this Court holds that the breath test regulations were violated, and further holds 
that such violation was not a reasonable departure from the regulations, defendant still is not 
5
 "[A] state procedure does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our 
thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar." Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 451 (1992) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
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entitled to the sweeping remedy of exclusion or suppression of his breath test result. All that 
would be required is a ruling that the prosecution cannot prove the Intoxilyzers' accuracy by 
hearsay, as provided in section 41-6-44.3, but must instead do so in non-hearsay fashion, i.e., by 
Trooper Hathcock's live testimony. In this case, the trial court did not address this fallback 
contention from the State; nevertheless, it was raised, and is therefore preserved for appellate 
review (R. 71, 73). See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). Further, this final State's 
argument has been adopted by some of the other trial courts to consider the "OK" issue (Br. of 
Appellant at 15 n.15), so that appellate guidance is warranted. 
The appropriateness of a limited remedy for the alleged regulatory violation is apparent 
from the final subsection of the breath test statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1993). That 
subsection states that if the proffered hearsay—Intoxilyzer Affidavits and the like—is in order, 
"there is a presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of 
the [breath test] evidence is unnecessary." Subsec. 41-6-44.3(3) (emphasis added). By obvious 
implication, if those hearsay documents are not in order, there is no presumption of validity, and 
further foundation must be laid for admission of the breath test result. In no way does the breath 
test statute exclude breath test evidence altogether if the hearsay documents are unsatisfactory. 
This conclusion is supported by prior judicial examinations of Utah's breath test statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that the statute is intended to relieve DUI prosecutors "of 
the financial burden of calling as a witness in every DUI case the public officer responsible for 
testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer equipment." Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1319-
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20 (Utah 1983) {cited and quoted in Emerson, 861 P.2d at 445-46). The statute has never been 
construed to require exclusion of breath test evidence if its conditions are not met.6 
To the contrary, if the hearsay foundation is in order, the breath test statute creates a 
rebuttable presumption, consistent with the "universal acceptance" of breath test reliability, Hall, 
663 P.2d at 1320, that the defendant's test result is accurate. Consistent with the statutory text 
and with Hall, failure to establish that foundation by hearsay means only that the prosecution 
must establish that foundation by live testimony. See Oveson, 514 P.2d at 804-05 (live testimony 
by testing officer overcame defect of his failure to check one box on breath test checklist).7 Thus 
in this case, the State would call Trooper Hathcock to testify about the monthly "bookend" 
Intoxilyzer certifications that he performed prior to and after defendant Garcia's breath was 
tested. But no further remedy is due to defendant Garcia, and other like-situated DUI defendants, 
for the recordkeeping error alleged in cases such as this one. For this reason also, the trial court's 
denial of defendant Garcia's motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
6
 In fact, Hall indicates that when the hearsay foundation is adequate, the prosecution should be entitled to a jury 
instruction explaining the rebuttable presumption that the breath test is reliable. Defendant may then introduce 
evidence to rebut that presumption. See Hall, 663 P.2d at 1322. 
7
 The Alaska Supreme Court further justified its holding as follows: "A clerical error by the test operator ought 
not to render the results inadmissible without a showing that the validity of the results is tainted. Were we to hold 
otherwise, we would be inviting a contest to find technical defects, regardless of their impact on the validity of the 
test results." 574 P.2d at 805. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Garcia's DUI conviction should be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ( ? day of November, 1997. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. I am the Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol and the official keeper of and 
responsible for the maintenance check records of the breathtesting instruments maintained in the 
State of Utah. 
Attached are true and correct copies of the records of maintenance and certification for the 
Intoxilyzer serial number _ (etc -PC ^ / / 7 7 located at ^\M{ ^Ulafo^ of 
which are kept on file by me, in the course of official business, for the State of Utah, Department 
of Public Safety and in accordance with the current regulations of the Commissioner of Public 
Safety. 
3. The attached tests were done before and after the date of 
The breathtest technician (s) whose signature (s) appear on the attached affidavit (s) are certified 
by the State of Utah and has/have met all of the following requirements as required by the 
Department of Public Safety: 
Satisfactory completion of operator's initial certification course and/or renewal course; 
Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's course offered by the 
Indiana University, or an equivalent course of instruction, as approved by the Breath Alcohol 
Testing Program; 
Satisfactory completion of a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument Manufacturer's 
Maintenance/Repair Technician course for the instruments in use in the State of Utah or is 
qualified by nature of his/her employment or training to maintain/repair those instruments; 
Maintain Technician's status through a minimum of eight (8) hours related training each 
calender year. 
I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters! alleged inthis affidavit. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
IRENE G. SWENSON 
5757 South 320 West 
Murray, Utah 84107 
My Commission Expires 
August 1,1998 
STATE OF UTAH 
idy Hamaker 
Breathtesting Supervisor 
Utah Highway Patrol 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 1>a,U-lftkg f) r^ 
ON THE ??A DAY O F T M r . j i 19°77. PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, JUDY HAMAKER, WHO 
BEING DULY SWORN BEFORE J^ fe EXECUTED THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I CERTIFY THAT 
SAID PERSON IS AN OFFICER AM) EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMENT AND 
THAT HER SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE. 
NOTARY PUBLIC \%\?-Ai I] ^qtnsy) 
.•AH DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY RECORD OF INTQXILYZER TEST AND AFFIDAVTT 
We t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , b e i n g f i r s t d u l y s w o r n , s t a t e t h a t : _ 
.L5000_L 
THE 
1. B r e a t h t e s t i n g instrument ' INTOXILYZER, s e r i a l number &b -QQ3>H7"? 
l o c a t e d at^QCrrrtc^ftrr/AKe. P.O. 
.was p r o p e r l y checked by m e / u s i n 
t h e c o u r s e of o f f i c i a l d u t i e s , on Q*-l APKSC 1 9 9 6 a t iO'3o AM 
2 . T h i s was ddne by a c u r r e n t l y c e r t i f i e d t e c h n i c i a n and a c c o r d i n g t o 
t h e s t a n d a r d s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e Commiss ioner of t h e U t a h D e p a r t m e n t 
of P u b l i c S a f e t y . 
3 . T h i s i s t h e o f f i c i a l r e c o r d and n o t e s of t h i s p r o c e d u r e w h i c h w e r e 
made a t t h e t i m e t h e s e t e s t s were d o n e . 
4 . I a m / w e a r e c o m p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y a n d h a v e p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e o f t h e 
m a t t e r s a l l e g e d i n t h i s a f f i d a v i t . 
FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: YES NO ( *^ E l e c t r i c a l p o w e r c h e c k : 
(Red p o w e r s w i t c h on ( R e a d s , "Not R e a d y " ) ( */) 
( ^ T e m p e r a t u r e C h e c k ( R e a d s " P u s h b u t t o n t o s t a r t , " e t c • ) . . . ( \y^ 
( • f I n t e r n a l P u r g e C h e c k : 
( a i r pump w o r k s , r u n s f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 15 s e c o n d s ) ( iS*\ 
( is*f I n t e r n a l C a l i b r a t i o n Check : 
(3 s t a n d a r d s . 1 0 0 , . 2 0 0 , . 3 0 0 , w i t h i n + o r - .005 o r 5% 
w h i c h e v e r i s t h e g r e a t e s t ( \y^ 
( ^ ) I n v a l i d t e s t (Push g r e e n s t a r t b u t t o n w h i l e i n s t r u m e n t 
i s i n t e s t mode , i n s t r u m e n t w i l l p r i n t " I n v a l i d T e s t " ) . . . ( :/) 
( is^ D i a g n o s t i c c h e c k (Prom c h e c k , Ram check , Temp c h e c k , 
P r o c e s s o r c h e c k , P r i n t e r c h e c k ) ( i/} 
( ^f C h e c k e d w i t h known s a m p l e : ( s i m u l a t o r , 3 t e s t s w i t h i n 
+ o r - . 005 o r 5% w h i c h e v e r i s t h e g r e a t e s t ) ( £/) 
( <xjT"Gives r e a d i n g s i n grams of a l c o h o l p e r 210 l i t e r s of 
breath ( ^ ) 
REPAIRS REQUIRED ( Explain) t^ Ci RePfrSRS 
_ _ _ ( ) 
( ^T^The simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded ( / ) 
( L^f^The results of this test show that the instrument is 
working properly ( ^*j 
^r 
L a s t p r i o r c h e c k of t h i s i n s t r u m e n t <££_. 
NOTARY PUBLIC." 
GRETCHEN LOWE 
8757 South 320 W*«t 
Murray. Utah W107 
||»Conwni*»ionExpl«» 
8«pt«mb«f8.1898 
CT ATE OF UTAH 
was d o n e on Ci\ /)lA(3Cfl 
CERTIFIED BREATH-TEST TECHNICIAN ( S ) 
I / W e , on o a t h , s t a t e t h a - t ( g o i n g i s t r u e , 
S u b s c r i b e d a n d s w o r n b e f o r e me t h i s M T n d a y of . 
[ijrkJnui retire , 
o 
_isQlo-
N o t a r y / P u b l i c 
rAIi DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY RECORD OF INTQXILYZER TEST AND AFFIDAVTT fSQQQ^ 
We the undersigned, being firs^ t duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument INTOXILYZER, serial number <o^ > -OQ3M77 
located atc^r^n^o>XCT^V<g. *ft D. was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on Q(b M M 1 9 % at Q 8 : 6 3 A M . 
2. This was d<3ne by a currently certified technician and according to 
the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah Department 
of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were 
made at the time these tests were done. 
4. I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the 
matters alleged in this affidavit. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: YES NO 
') Electrical power check: 
(Red power switch on (Reads, "Not Ready" ) 
^) Temperature Check (Reads "Push button to start," etc.).. 
S) internal Purge Check: 
(air pump works, runs for approximately 15 seconds) . . . . 
*
/) Internal Calibration Check: 
(3 standards .100, .200, .300, within + or - .005 or 5% 
whichever is the greatest 
/) Invalid test (Push green start button while instrument 
is in test mode, instrument will print "Invalid Test"). 
^) Diagnostic check (Prom check, Ram check, Temp check, 
Processor check, Printer check) 
•'') Checked with known sample: (simulator, 3 tests within 
+ or - . 005 or 5% whichever is the greatest) 
) Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of... 
breath 
REPAIRS REQUIRED ( Explain) N\Q^£_ 
( cQPS&ito ftsse^ -TSflve. ^ c^V^iGtrr S&MAI^S ~mcx\z \ 
^f The simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded 




Last prior check of this instrument was done on CA AegftL 19^fa 
CERTIFIED BREATH TEST TECHNICIAN(S) S   
/icTUcoa/—^ 
We, on o a t h , s t a t e t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i s t r u e 
S u b s c r i b e d , ^ t n d s w o r n b e f o r e me t h i s ffy day of Mfrj 19 3U 
Notaj o i b y i c 
APPENDIX II 
Synopsis of Cases Cited by Defendant 
(ref. to fh. 4 of this brief) 
The following noncontrolling cases relied upon by defendant Garcia are off-point from 
the claim of error that he asserts in this appeal. 
Lake v. MVD, 892 P.2d 1025 (Or. App. 1995) (Br. of Appellant at 17). Held: Breath test 
result suppressed because inspecting technician failed to sign the certification report. (In Utah, 
this would be equivalent to having unsigned, unsworn Intoxilyzer Affidavits.) 
Westerman v. State, 525 P.2d 1359 (Okl. Crim. App. 1974) (Br. of Appellant at 17). 
Held: Breath test result suppressed because prosecution presented no evidence that the 
instrument had been certified (in Utah, equivalent to providing no proof whatsoever of the 
instrument's accuracy). Also, the officer who tested defendant's breath did not testify that he 
followed prescribed breath test procedure. 
Bryant v. Comm r ofDep 't of Public Safety, 937 P.2d 496 (Okl. 1996) (Br. of Appellant 
at 17). Held: Breath test result suppressed because prosecution failed to provide defendant with 
preserved breath sample when preserved sample was timely requested under state statute. The 
agency had lost defendant's request and destroyed the breath sample. 
State v. Fogle, 459 P.2d 873 (Or. 1969) (en banc) (Br. of Appellant at 19). Held: Breath 
test result suppressed because prosecution had failed to prove that the instrument had been "spot-
checked" and certified for accuracy every 60 days as required by statute. (No proof that 
instrument was accurate.) 
Keel v. State, 609 P.2d 555 (Alaska 1980) (Br. of Appellant at 20). Held: Breath test 
result suppressed because pre-test calibration/certification had not been proven to have been 
performed by a "qualified Breathalyzer instructor" as required by regulations. 
Klebs v. State, 305 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. App. 1974) (Br. of Appellant at 20). Held: Breath 
test result suppressed because prosecution failed to establish any of the three elements of 
foundation—that test was given by certified operator, that instrument had been tested and 
approved, and that operator used approved testing technique. 
State v. Krause, 405 So.2d 832 (La. 1981) (Br. of Appellant at 20). Held: Breath test 
result suppressed because prosecution did not prove satisfactory pre-test "spot check" of 
chemical "ampul" used in the testing instrument, as required during instrument recertification 
every four months. 
State v. Hall 315 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio App. 1974) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held: Breath 
test result suppressed because prosecution failed to show that calibration solution (known 
reference sample) used to certify the instrument had not exceeded its labelled shelf life. 
State v. Fellows, 352 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio App. 1975) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held: 
Breath test result suppressed because certification/calibration officer failed to testify about 
successful pre-test inspection and calibration. The use of his certification log page, without his 
testimony, violated constitutional confrontation right. 
State v. Dyer, 233 S.E.2d 309 (W.Va. 1977) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held: Breath test 
result suppressed because prosecution failed to prove that routine calibrations/inspections had 
been conducted every ten tests or nine days as required by statute and by regulation. 
State v. Wills, 359 So.2d 566 (Fla. App. 1978) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held: Breath test 
result suppressed because test equipment, in violation of explicit regulation, had been left 
accessible to persons who were not authorized breath test technicians. 
State v. Koch, 671 N.E.2d 333 (Ohio App. 1996) (Br. of Appellant at 27). Held: Breath 
test result suppressed because instrument had not been tested for possible interference by all 
three bands of possible radio interference, as required by regulation. 
People v. Orth, "330 N.E.2d 210" (111. 1988) (Br. of Appellant at 27-28). State's counsel 
could not find this case at the identified citation. 
